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THOMAS G. MELLING• 
A uniform system of managing information technology and 
computer networks is needed to cope with the impact of 
the information age. It is the responsibility of the legisla-
ture to manage this technology and to change or amend 
the statutes as needed. 1 
Digitalization of information and communications is causing both 
subtle and dramatic changes in our society. Computers and other new 
digital technologies make communications faster and more efficient, and 
lower the cost and increase the availability of information. They also 
may pose problems for existing laws, many of which were adopted or 
promulgated long before the digital era. Legal articles frequently raise 
the question whether existing laws are outdated and unsuited for the 
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I. It's In The Cards, Inc. v. Fuschetto, 535 N.W.2d 11, 15 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). 
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issues created by digital technologies, or whether such laws are 
satisfactory and do not need to be modified.2 
To date, changes to existing laws have been mostly academically 
debated, but not enacted. One exception is in the field of electronic 
commerce. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Law (NCCUSL) will soon produce Article 2B of the Uniform 
Commercial Code.3 This new UCC article, upon adoption by individual 
states, will govern all transactions in software, and the licensing of 
information.4 The most significant legislative activity, however, has 
occurred in the area of digital signatures. At least 12 states have enacted 
some form of digital signature legislation, which provide a framework 
for the authentication of computer-based transactions and communica-
tions. An equal number of states are considering legislation or will 
likely enact some form of legislation soon.5 
Although digital signature legislation has been adopted or is being 
considered by many states,6 some legal commentators question its 
necessity and assert that such legislation may be more harmful than 
beneficial. Brad Biddle presents these arguments in his article "Legislat-
ing Market Winners: Digital Signature Laws and the Electronic 
Commerce Marketplace."7 According to Biddle, digital signature 
legislation should not be enacted for two reasons. First, it is unnecessary 
2. See, e.g., Wendy R. Leibowitz, Personal Privacy and High Tech: Li/Ile 
Brothers Are Watching You, NAT'L L.J., April 7, 1997, at Bl6 (discussing whether 
privacy law can "cope" with the Internet); Craig J. Blakeley, No Bliss Yet for Online 
Calls, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 3, 1997, at Cl (discussing regulation oflong-distance telephone 
calls over the Internet); Wendy R. Leibowitz, The Internet Blunts TM Protection, NAT'L 
L.J., Feb. 10, 1997, at Bl (discussing the "problems arising from the application of 
trademark law to the Internet''); Stuart D. Levi & Robert Sporn, Can Programs Bind 
Humans to Contracts, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 13, 1997, at B9 (discussing how "'intelligent 
agents' capable of shopping the Web and entering 'click wrap' pacts wreak havoc with 
aged contract and agency laws"). 
3. See A. Brian Dengler, UCC Article 2B on the Fast Track: New Commercial 
Rules Around the Comer, 4 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST, Jan. 1997, at 6. 
4. The most current draft of Article 2B can be found online at Unifonn 
Commercial Code Article 2B Revision Home Page (visited Oct. 6, I 997) <http:// 
www.Jaw.uh.edu/ucc2b>. 
S. A state-by-state summary of legislation is available online at McBride Baker 
& Coles, Summary of Legislation and Other Initiatives Relating to Digital Signatures, 
Electronic Signatures and Cryptography (visited Oct. 6, 1997) <http://www.mbc.com/ 
ds_swn.html>. The State of Massachusetts also has a summary online at Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts, Information Technology Division Legal Department, The Citizens 
Would Rather Be On-Line Than In Line (visited Oct 6, 1997) <http://www.magnet.state. 
ma.us/itd/legal>. 
6. For a summary of state and federal initiatives, see (visited Feb. 26, 1998) 
<http://www.mbc.com/ds_swn.html>. 
7. C. Bradford Biddle, Legislating Market Winners: Digital Signature Laws and 
the Electronic Commerce Marketplace, 34 San Diego L. Rev. 1225 (1998). 
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because the legal uncertainties and risks associated with the use of 
digital signatures can be solved by parties through private contracts. 
Moreover, argues Biddle, the "open PK.1''8 system is based upon 
business models that cannot absorb the liabilities from fraudulent use of 
digital signatures. Only through private contracts, or a "closed PKr' 
system, will digital signatures be feasible. Second, Biddle argues that 
digital signature legislation will harm the infant electronic commerce 
market by legislating market winners and will expose consumers to 
unreasonable risk and liabilities. 
This Article responds to Biddle's arguments against digital signature 
legislation. The focal point for the response is the Washington 
Electronic Authentication Act.9 Although the Washington Act is similar 
to the Utah Digital Signature Act10 and the "open PK.I'' system 
described by Biddle, new amendments to the Washington Act avoid 
some of the problems and concerns raised by Biddle. Part I explains the 
history of the Act's adoption, and details some of the amendments that 
make it unique. Part II rejects most of Biddle's arguments about digital 
signature legislation. Because the Washington Act creates default 
background rules that may be altered by private contract, there is little 
or no risk that the Washington Act will legislate market winners, or 
distort the electronic commerce market. However, Part II agrees that 
digital signature legislation, including the Washington Act, fails to 
adequately protect consumers. Although Biddle overstates the risk, the 
Washington Act and other digital signature legislation should be 
amended because even if the risk is not high, consumers' perceptions 
of the risk will impede their use of digital signatures. Finally, Part II 
challenges Biddle's conclusion that a closed PKI system will ultimately 
8. "Open PKI'' refers to a type of public key infrastructure ("PKI"). According 
to Biddle: 
The Utah Act and its progeny, and the ABA Guidelines, are premised on an 
"open system" or "open loop" model of PKI. The open PKI model envisions 
that subscribers will obtain a single certificate from an independent third-party 
CA which certifies that subscriber's identity. [Subscribers] will then use that 
certificate to facilitate [all] transactions with potentially numbers merchants 
and/or other individuals. 
Biddle, supra note 7, at 1234-35. As discussed in Part I infra, this Article uses a similar 
definition of an "open PKI'' system, but does not assume that a subscriber will obtain 
only a single certificate. Each person or entity may obtain multiple certificates for the 
types of transactions in which they will be creating a digital signature. 
9. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.34.010 - 19.34.903 (Supp. 1997). 
10. UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 46-3-101 - 46-3-504 (Supp. 1997). 
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prevail over an open PKI system. Over time both open and closed 
systems will be used in the marketplace. If digital signatures become 
the preferred means of conducting electronic commerce, especially with 
consumers, it is likely that some type of open PKI system will be widely 
accepted. 
I. WASHINGTON'S ELECTRONIC AUTHENTICATION ACT 
This article presumes that the reader is familiar with the basic 
technology of digital signatures and the relationships between the 
subscriber, certification authority, repository, and relr."1g party in the 
process of creating and verifying a digital signature. 1 To understand 
the reasons for supporting the Washington Act, however, it is necessary 
to summarize its key provisions. In addition, this Part details the signifi-
cant new amendments to the Washington Act, which help resolve some 
of the potential problems. 
The Washington Electronic Authentication Act, originally enacted in 
April 1996, closely followed the model established by the Utah Digital 
Signature Act. Washington's legislature, however, chose to delay 
implementation of the Washington Act until January 1, 1998;2 and to 
convene a task force to examine the business and legal issues associated 
with digital signatures. Members of the task force included government 
officials, lawyers, and representatives from a wide array of business 
interests, including banks, the insurance industry, and software and 
computer companies. The task force met throughout 1996 and into early 
1997, and ultimately recommended several significant amendments to 
the original Act. Although the task force and other individuals who 
became involved in the amendment process did not agree on all 
modifications, a compromise was reached, and the Washington 
legislature passed Senate Bill 5308 during the 1997 legislative ses-
I 1. For more information about digital signatures, see Infonnntion Security 
Committee, Electronic Commerce and Infonnation Technology Division, Section of 
Science and Technology, Digital Signature Guidelines: Legal Infrastructure for 
Certification Authorities and Secure Electronic Commerce, 1996 A.B.A. SEC. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REP., at 3-17 (visited Mar. 9, 1998) <http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/ 
dsgfree.html>; A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in 
Electronic Commerce, 15 OR. L. REV. 49, 51-67 (1996); ONLINE LAW: THE SPA'S 
LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS ON THE lNTERNET (Thomas J. Smedinghoff ed., 
1996). 
12. WASH. Rl!v. CODE§ 19.34.901 (Supp. 1997). 
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sion.13 The Washington Secretary of State, with consultation from the 
task force, has also implemented regulations for the Act. 
The rules established in the Washington Act can be generally 
categorized as follows: (1) the licensing of certification authorities; (2) 
the issuance, suspension and revocation of certificates; (3) duties, 
warranties, and obligations of licensed certification authorities, subscrib-
ers, and relying third parties; and (4) rules regarding the validity of 
digital signatures. 
Under the Act, certification authorities do not need to obtain a license 
to conduct business.14 Although the decision whether or not to obtain 
a license is voluntary, licensed certification authorities enjoy several 
benefits under the Act. Their liability is limited in certain circumstanc-
es.15 Also, the Act establishes a presumption that a digital signature 
verifiable to a public key listed in a valid certificate issued by a licensed 
certification authority satisfies formal requirements of a signature.16 
The Act is silent as to whether a digital signature associated with an 
unlicensed certification authority satisfies the requirements of a 
signature. To obtain a license, a certification authority must (a) itself 
have been issued a certificate which is published in a recognized 
repository, (b) employ operative personnel who have demonstrated 
knowledge of the requirements of the Act and who have not been 
convicted of fraud or a recent felony, ( c) file a suitable guaranty with the 
Washington Secretary of State, ( d) use a trustworthy system, and ( e) 
have an office in the state of Washington.17 
The licensing requirements are potentially an important aspect of an 
open PK.I system. An open system is only viable if relying parties 
believe certification authorities are trustworthy, and that the certification 
authority has properly bound the subscriber to the public key listed in 
13. Senate Bill 5308 was enacted on April 15, 1997. S. 5308, 55th Leg., !st Reg. 
Sess. (Wash. 1997). For a copy of the Act (as amended) as well as the new regulations 
implementing the Act, see (visited Feb. 26, 1998) <http://www.wa.gov/sec/corps/ 
digsig.htm>. 
14. The Washington Act does not apply to unlicensed certification authorities, 
except as specifically provided. WASH. REY. CODE § 19.34.100(7) (Supp. 1997). 
Furthermore, the Act states that the licensing provisions of the Act "do not affect the 
effectiveness, enforceability, or validity of any digital signature .••• " WASH. REV. 
CoDE § 19.34.100(6) (Supp. 1997). 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 23-24. 
16. WASH. REV. CODE§ 19.34.300 (Supp. 1997). 
17. WASH. REV. CODE§ 19.34.100 (1996). 
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the certificate. The licensing requirements attempt to provide some 
assurances to relying parties that the certification authorities are, in fact, 
trustworthy. It is likely, however, that the reputation and brand name of 
a certification authority will be far more important to a relying party 
than proof that a certification authority has obtained a license from the 
Washington Secretary of State.18 In addition to licensing, other 
approaches are being considered to address the reliability of certification 
authorities and certificates. The Information Security Committee of the 
American Bar Association is working to develop a rating system for 
certificates, much like a bond rating system.19 It is unclear whether 
such a rating system will ultimately prove feasible, however, because of 
the large number of variables that can affect the reliability of certificates. 
South Carolina is considering legislation that ''would allow only 
attorneys, financial institutions, title insurance companies, and certain 
government agencies to serve as certification authorities."20 
The Act prescribes several conditions that must be satisfied before a 
licensed certification authority may issue a certificate. These conditions 
include confirmation by the certification authority that: (i) the subscriber 
is the person to be listed on the certificate, (ii) the information in the 
certificate is accurate, (iii) a prospective subscriber rightfully holds a 
private key corresponding to the public key to be listed in the certificate, 
and (iv) the certificate provides information sufficient to locate or 
identify one or more repositories in which notification of the revocation 
or suspension of the certificate would be listed.21 The certificate may 
also include a "reliance limit," which is "the monetary amount recom-
mended for reliance on a certificate .... "22 
If the certification authority satisfies the above requirements, the 
certification authority is not liable for losses caused by reliance on a 
false or forged digital signature of a subscriber.23 If, however, the 
licensed certification authority fails to satisfy these requirements, the 
certification authority is liable up to the amount of the recommended 
reliance limit specified in the certificate.24 
18. Mike Rodin, Digital Signatures - Get Ready 'Cause Here They Come, 22 Bus. 
L. SEC. NEWSL 3, at 4 (1997). 
19. lnfonnation Security Committee, Section of Science and Technology, 
Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework, 1997 A.B.A. SEC. SCI, & 
TEC!L INFO. SEC. COMMITTEE ( visited Mar. 9, 1998) <http://www.abanet.org>. 
20. Christy Tinnes, Digital Signatures Come to South Carolina: The Proposed 
Digital Signature Act of 1997, 48 S.C. L. REV. 427, 431 (1997). 
21. WASH. REV. CODE§ 19.34.210 (Supp. 1997). 
22. WASH. REV. CODE§ 19.34.020(28) (1996). 
23. WASH. REV. CODE§ 19.34.280(a) (1996). 
24. WASH. REV. CODE§ 19.34.280(2)(b) (1996). 
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Upon acceptance of a certificate, the subscriber "assumes a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to retain control of the private key."25 The 
subscriber is released from this duty if the certificate expires or is 
revoked. If a subscriber does not exercise reasonable care, and loses 
control of his or her private key, such subscriber bears unlimited 
liability, provided, however, that the recipient of a digital signature 
assumes the risk that a digital signature is forged if reliance on the 
digital signature is not reasonable under the circumstances.26 For 
example, it may not be reasonable to rely upon a purchase order for a 
product costing $3,000 if the reliance limit in the certificate is only 
$1,000. 
A digital signature satisfies the formal requirements of a signature if 
the digital signature is verifiable by reference to the public key listed in 
a valid certificate issued by a licensed certification authority.27 The Act 
also establishes several presumptions in the adjudication of disputes. If 
a digital signature can be verified to the public key listed in a valid 
certificate, it is legally presumed the digital signature is the digital 
signature of the subscriber listed in the certificate.28 In addition, any 
digitally signed message satisfies the evidentiary requirements of an 
original.29 
Most of the provisions described above are similar to the Utah Digital 
Signature Act. However, recent amendments to the Washington Act 
make it unique in several respects. A majority of the members of the 
task force preparing the amendments and other interested parties believed 
that the acceptance of a digital signature should be voluntary. Several 
provisions of the Washington Act address this concern. The Act 
provides that nothing precludes the recipient of a digital signature from 
establishing conditions under which the recipient will accept the digital 
signature.30 It also provides that any recipient or other person asked to 
rely on a digital signature is not obligated to accept a digital signature 
25. WASH. REv. CODE§ 19.34.240(1) (1996). 
26. WASH. REv. CODE§§ 19.34.240(1), 19.34.310 (1996). 
27. WASH. REV. CODE§ 19.34.300 (Supp. 1997). 
28. WASH. REV. CODE§§ 19.34.240(1), 19.34.350(3) (1996). 
29. WASH. REV. CODE§§ 19.34.320, 19.34.330 (Supp. 1997). 
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.34.320 (Supp. 1997), Section 19.34.320 of the 
Revised Code of Washington also provides that a digitally signed message shall not be 
deemed to be an instrument under Washington's Uniform Commercial Code unless all 
the parties to the transaction agree. Id. 
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or to respond to an electronic message containing a digital signature, 
except for digital signatures from courts.31 While many commentators 
have been critical of digital signature legislation because of the liability 
exposure to subscribers, there has been less debate about the implications 
of forcing people to use this new technology. The Washington Act 
should help resolve such concerns. 
The new amendments also explicitly provide that the Act's provisions 
may be modified by agreement, excit that a person may not disclaim 
responsibility for lack of good faith.3 Thus, nothing prevents parties, 
including a licensed certification authority, from contractually creating 
a closed system. For example, parties may create a hybrid system that 
uses some of the default rules provided by the Act, but modify other 
provisions to suit the parties' particular needs. 
The Washington Act is similar but not necessarily identical to the 
open PICT model described by Biddle. The Washington Act is an open 
system because the legal presumptions and obligations apply to any 
certificate issued by a licensed certification authority. Biddle's 
definition of an open system, however, "envisions that subscribers will 
obtain a single certificate from an independent third-party CA which 
certifies that subscriber's identity."33 Although it is possible for a 
subscriber to conduct all transactions using only one certificate under the 
Washington Act, its seems more likely that subscribers will use more 
than one certificate depending upon the type of transaction. For 
example, a subscriber may have a low level certificate to sign electronic 
mail or purchase small products. They may obtain transactional 
certificates for larger transactions.34 
II. A DEFENSE OF OPEN PKI LEGISLATION 
The Internet and other open networks create a tremendous opportunity 
for electronic commerce. The disadvantage of an open network, 
however, is that communications and transactions are generally unsecure. 
The movement to enact digital signature legislation has arisen from 
efforts to resolve these security problems. While a public key infrastruc-
ture provides a framework to authenticate computer-based transactions 
31. The phrase "accept a digital signature" means to verify a digital signature or 
talce an action in reliance on a digital signature. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.34.020(2) 
(Supp. 1997). 
32. S. 5308, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., § 34 (Wash. 1997). 
33. Biddle, supra note 7, at 1234. 
34. A transactional certificate is a "certificate incorporating by reference one or 
more digital signatures,'' but which use only one for individual transactions. WASH. 
REv. CODE§ 19.34.020(37) (Supp. 1997); see also Froomkin, supra note 11, at 63-65. 
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and communications, most scholars agree that the existing laws that 
would govern an open PKI system are uncertain.35 Digital signature 
legislation such as the Washington Act establishes clear rules regarding 
the validity and enforceability of digital signatures, as well as the 
liabilities and obligations of the subscriber, certification authority, 
repository, and relying party. 
In his arguments against the adoption of open PKI legislation, Biddle 
does not assert that the existing l~ws that would govern an open PKI 
system are clear. Rather, Biddle argues that existing legal uncertainties 
can be resolved through contracts-that is, a closed PKI system in which 
the subscriber, relying party, and certification authority contractually 
establish rules governing the enforceability of digital signatures and the 
allocation of liability. Moreover, he asserts that open PKI legislation is 
not viable because it creates "immense" liabilities that cannot and will 
not be absorbed by affected parties.36 The harm of implementing such 
legislation, according to Biddle, is the risk of "profoundly distorting an 
infant market," which may impede the growth of electronic commerce, 
and "lock-in" laws harmful to consumers.37 This Section examines 
these arguments, responding first to the arguments about the potential of 
an open PKI legislation. The second half analyzes whether a closed PKI 
system will ultimately prevail, and discusses some of the shortcomings 
of a system that must rely solely on private contracts. 
35. See Froomkin, supra note 11, at 84. The draft Report by the Internet Law & 
Policy Forum concludes: 
[I']here is no doubt that the specter of liability for breach of contract and for 
negligence significantly deter the entry of CAs into the markel At this point 
there are no efficient markets for insurance to spread risk through the 
industzy---rneaning that CAs face meaningful unquantifiable risks of large 
losses. Placing risk of loss on CAs when CAs act reasonably would likely 
make those risks untenable, posing a grave threat to the development of the 
CA industry. 
The Role of Certification Authorities in Consumer Transactions: A Report of the ILPF 
Working Group on Certification Authority Practices (draft), 1997 INTERNET LAW & 
POLICY FORUM, at 20 (on file with author) [hereinafter Role of Certification Authorities]. 
See also U.N. COMMISSION ON lNT'L TRADE LAW, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP 
ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ON THE WORK OF ITS 'IlllRTY-FIRST SESSION, at 7, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.9/437 (1997) (English version, on file with author) ("[I']he absence ofa legal 
regime for digital and other electronic signatures might pose an impediment to electronic 
transactions effected through electronic means."). 
36. Biddle, supra note 7, at 1226. 
37. Id. at 1226. 
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A. Avoiding the Potential Harms 
1. Uniform Default Rules 
The primary purpose of the Washington Act is to establish clear 
default rules governing transactions involving digital signatures. While 
the Utah Act does not address whether it may be modified, Washing• 
ton's Act specifically provides that rules regarding the allocation of 
liability may be contractually altered by the parties.38 For example, a 
certification authority may be licensed in Washington, and still be part 
of a closed system that contractually controls the use of digital signatures 
and reallocates the risk of loss between the subscriber, relying parties, 
and the licensed certification authority. Thus, the Act does not interfere 
with the development of closed PKI systems.· 
The ability to contractually alter default rules is an important principle 
of commercial law.39 Freedom of contract is a basic philosophy of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, and should be included in any digital 
signature legislation that creates rules governing the parties' obligations 
and liabilities.40 
Furthermore, although the default rules are only applicable to licensed 
certification authorities, there is nothing in the Act that prevents an 
unlicensed certification authority from issuing certificates as part of a 
closed PKI system. Some commentators have argued that the Washing-
ton Act may force all certification authorities to obtain a license because 
only licensed certification authorities receive limited liability under the 
Washington Act. This argument is flawed, because, as Biddle correctly 
38. WASH. REV. CODE§ 19.34.350 (Supp. 1997). This provision was adopted 
from Section 34 of the 1997 Amendments, which provides: 
The effect of this chapter may be varied by agreement, except 
(1) A person may not disclaim responsibility for lack of good faith, hut 
parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the duty of 
good faith is to be measured if the standards are not manifestly unreason-
able; and 
(2) As otherwise provided in this chapter. 
S. 5308, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., § 34 (Wash. 1997). The only provisions of the 
legislation that may not be altered are the certification authorities' warranties about the 
contents of a certificate. Id. 
39. Raymond T. Nimmer, UCC Revision: lnfonnation Age in Contracts, 29 
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 17 (1996). 
40. Section of Business Law Ad Hoc Task Force on Electronic Contracting, 
National Conference of Commissioners on Unifbnn State Laws Drafting Committee on 
Electronic Contracting-Proposal on Scope of Model [Electronic Contracting] Act, 1996 
A.B.A. SEC. Bus. LAW AD Hoc TASK FORCE ON ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING (visited 
Mar. 9, 1998) <http://www.abanetorg>. 
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argues, parties in a closed PKI system can not only limit the scope of 
their liability, but can further establish rules governing the allocation of 
risk and the validity of digital signatures.41 If Biddle is correct that a 
closed PKI model will ultimately prevail, we should see a robust 
unlicensed certification authority market develop in the state of 
Washington even though only licensed certification authorities enjoy the 
liability limitations under the Act. 
2. Correcting the Risk of Potential Consumer Liability 
Biddle's second argument, which has been raised by other legal 
observers,42 is that open PKI legislation shifts liability exposure to 
consumers. Under the Washington Act, a subscriber has unlimited 
liability if the subscriber does not exercise reasonable care to protect his 
or her private key.43 To dramatize the potential implications of this 
provision, Biddle gives the example of a "Grandmom" who does not 
exercise reasonable care, incurs $25,000 of liability, and loses her 
house.44 While this example raises concerns, the actual risk to consum-
ers is probably small. Most cases of fraud will very likely arise from 
theft of a consumer's key. And if a consumer's private key is stolen, 
the determination of whether the consumer was negligent will be decided 
by a judge or jury and would probably require egregious facts. In 
addition, the subscriber is not liable under the Washington Act if 
reliance upon the certificate is not reasonable.45 For example, 
Grandmom's key would probably have a relatively small reliance 
limit--she would most likely use it to order groceries at the local store 
for delivery rather than to purchase thousand dollar consumer goods. It 
is unlikely that she would be liable for any contract greater than the 
reliance limit in her certificate. 
Id. 
41. Biddle, supra note 7, at 1227. 
42. Role of Certification Authorities, supra note 35, at 21. The Report concludes: 
We believe that consumer protection is an integral step in encouraging the use 
of digital signatures •.•. We are concerned that unlimited losses could be a 
major disincentive for consumers to participate in the system. Thus, we 
suggest that consideration be given to limiting consumer liability even in the 
situation where a consumer does not act reasonably. 
43. See supra text accompanying note 25. 
44. Biddle, supra note 7, at 1236. 
45. WASH. REV. CODE§ 19.34.310 (Supp. 1997). 
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Even though the risk to consumers is probably small, there are at least 
two reasons why consumer liability should be limited. First, simply the 
perception of risk could drastically affect consumers' use of digital 
signatures. Consumers' fear about credit card security, not actual risk, 
has severely limited the growth of electronic commerce.46 
Second, digital signature legislation, like other commercial laws that 
establish default rules, should reflect the expectations of the parties. 
Raymond T. Nimmer, the NCCUSL Reporter for Article 2B, considers 
this to be a fundamental principle of contract law: 
Uniform contract laws do not regulate practice. They seek to sustain and 
facilitate it The benefits of codification lie in defining principles consistent 
with commercial practice which, because of their codification and their 
relevance to actual practice, can be relied on and are readily discernible and 
understandable to commercial parties.47 
The potential of unlimited liability from the loss of a private key is not 
consistent with consumers' expectations or existing law.48 Under the 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act, consumers' liability is capped in most 
cases at $50 even if the consumer did not act with reasonable care.49 
If the Washington Act is amended so that a subscriber's liability is 
limited to $50, a large proportion of the risk of liability would fall upon 
the relying party, because the certification authority's liability is limited 
to the reliance limit in the subscriber's certificate. This loss allocation 
would be appropriate in a merchant-consumer transaction, because the 
merchant is best able to spread the cost of fraud to all consumers 
through pricing.50 This loss allocation in merchant-merchant transac-
tions may be less important, suggesting that an amendment limiting a 
subscriber's liability for the negligent loss of a private key should apply 
only to consumers, not merchants. 
46. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weise, Promoters 1ry to Ease Shoppers' Fears of Credit 
Card Fraud on the Internet, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 22, 1997, at A4. 
47. Nimmer, supra note 39. 
48. C. Bradford Biddle, Misplaced Priorities: The Utah Digital Signature Act and 
Liability Allocation in a Public Key Infrastructure, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1143, 1170 
(1996). 
49. 15 u.s.c. § 1693(g) (1996). 
50. Role of Certification Authorities, supra note 35, at 20-21. The report believes 
that allocating the consumer/subscriber's liability to merchants is analogous to laws 
governing mail orders and telephone-based transactions in which merchants bear the risk. 
Id. 
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B. Open PKI vs. Closed PKI: Predicting the Winner 
Biddle argues that a closed PKI model, rather than an open PKI 
model, "will be the winner in the marketplace."51 His argument is 
based on the following assumption: Subscribers using a single certificate 
in an open PKI system create the potential of enormous liabilities from 
fraud, and parties will be unable to risk, and unwilling to incur, these 
liabilities. There are several reasons why this assumption should be 
questioned. 
Under the Washington Act, subscribers can obtain more than one 
certificate, and each certificate can limit its use to specific types of 
transactions. For example, the certificate can limit the monetary size of 
the transactions for which it is valid.52 It may also be possible to limit 
the types of recipients who are entitled to rely upon the certificate.53 
Consequently, parties can manage their potential liability exposure under 
the Washington Act just like parties in a closed system. 
Digital signature fraud may not be overwhelming or rampant. To 
illustrate the potential for fraud, Biddle cites examples of MasterCard 
and VISA losing over $1 billion per year from fraud and the City of Los 
Angeles expending $131 million in fraudulent real estate document 
filings in a twenty-seven month period. Most commentators, however, 
have concluded that private keys are much more secure than credit 
cards.54' Unlike an owner of a credit card who must disclose his or her 
credit card number for every transaction, a subscriber does not ever have 
to disclose his or her private key. In the case of fraudulent real estate 
document filings, digital signatures may greatly reduce the costs 
associated with forged signatures on real estate documents. It is much 
easier to forge a signature than to steal a subscriber's private key. Also, 
smartcards used in conjunction with digital signatures hold the possibili-
ty of dramatically reducing the potential for fraud. In France, smartcards 
51. Biddle, supra note 7, at 1242. 
52. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
53. It appears likely that the X.509 standards developed by the International 
Telecommunication Union will be used for digital signatures. Part 1, Section 4.2 of the 
X.509 standards is a unique identification field, which might be used to establish who 
may rely upon a certificate. See (visited Feb. 26, 1998) <ftp://ftp.ietf.org/intemet-
drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-partl-06.txt> for the latest version of the X.509 standards. 
54. See generally Froomkin, supra note 11, at 76 (discussing the availability and 
risk of various methods of electronic commerce). 
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with a password have reduced fraud from about $4 per card in 1992 to 
almost nothing today.55 Although smartcards are not generally avail-
able at this time in the United States, they have been used in Europe for 
years, and researchers predict that billions of smartcards will be in 
circulation by 2000.56 
Furthermore, the amount of fraud is only relevant when considered in 
relation to the benefits from the use of digital signatures. If the amount 
of new business generated by a merchant from digital signatures is ten 
times the amount of cost he or she incurs from fraud, the merchant will 
choose to accept digital signatures regardless of the liability scheme 
imposed. MasterCard and VISA may be losing over $1 billion per year 
to fraud, but their business is quite profitable. Whether digital signatures 
will provide enough new business to cover the potential costs from fraud 
remains to be seen. 
There are other reasons why a closed PK! system may not ultimately 
be the "winner." Such a system inherently requires a contractual 
relationship between the subscriber, relying party, and certification 
authority. These contractual obligations introduce extra transaction costs 
and reduce the efficient use of digital signatures. While this type of 
arrangement may be adequate for repeated transactions between two 
businesses, it is not as well suited for consumers or businesses which 
have only random contacts. Although the certification authority's 
liability exposure could potentially be solved without a contract through 
''webwrap" or "click through" contracts, there is presently no case law 
governing the enforceability of such provisions. Courts are increasingly 
upholding "shrinkwrap" contracts for software, but those cases involve 
a clear exchange of consideration. It is less clear whether there is 
sufficient consideration for a "click through" disclaimer to limit the 
remedies of a relying party. For example, assume that Alice and Bob 
enter into a written contract, with ordinary signatures. Under the terms 
of the contract, Bob may assign his economic rights to a third party. An 
imposter named Izzy obtains a certificate in the name of Bob from 
Cheapo Certificate Co. by presenting a poorly forged driver's license. 
Izzy creates a forged contract between Bob and Izzy which purports to 
transfer all of Bob's economic rights under the contract to Izzy. Izzy 
then sends the forged contract to Alice and demands payment. Cheapo 
Certificate Co. has a "click through" limitation on liability that limits its 
55. Tom Poremski & Paul Taylor, Smartcards: A Tec/znology Whose Time Has 
Come, FIN. TIMES, Oct 2, 1996, at 1. Smartcards are not tamperproof, however. See 
David Banlc, Smart Cards are Open to New Attack By Hackers, Say Israeli Researchers, 
WALL ST. J., Oct 21, 1996, at B14. 
56. Poremski & Taylor, supra note 55, at 1. 
1260 
[VOL.34: 1247, 1997] Authentication Act 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
liability to a fraction of Alice's potential loss. It seems doubtful that 
the "click through" limitation would be binding. 
Although Biddle believes that a closed PK! system is beginning to 
emerge as the marketplace winner, such a prediction is premature. 
Washington's digital signature law does not even become effective until 
January 1, 1998. Most lawyers are just learning that such a law 
exists.57 Other factors will initially slow the growth of an open PK! 
system. Consumers are not likely to widely use digital signatures until 
the liability risks are resolved. Also, while the Washington Act 
establishes clear default rules regarding the use of digital signature in 
intra-state transactions, the rules for multi-state transactions are less 
clear. For example, certification authorities licensed under the Washing-
ton Act may not have the benefits of statutory limitations on liability if 
a court determines that the contract between the subscriber and relying 
party is not governed by Washington law. Because individual state 
legislation cannot resolve the existing legal uncertainties about digital 
signatures on a national level, parties will very likely prefer closed 
system transactions until the federal government enacts national 
legislation, or a majority of states adopt a uniform digital signature law. 
While an open PK! system may be slower to develop, that itself is not 
a reason to reject digital signature laws such as the Washington Act. 
Digital signature legislation potentially has many benefits. If digital 
signature laws do not hinder private party transactions and do not force 
parties to assume liabilities they would otherwise avoid, the reasons for 
opposing such legislation disappear. 
In any event, trying to predict a winner between open and closed PK! 
systems may not be a worthwhile exercise. The line between an open 
and closed system will likely become increasingly blurred as more states 
adopt variations of the Utah Act, but give parties the freedom of 
contract.58 Parties will contractually modify the statutory default rules, 
creating a hybrid system. Ultimately, however, if more states adopt 
digital signature legislation, the levels of fraud become known, and 
digital signatures provide real benefits to consumers, parties will 
increasingly use an open PKI system. 
51. See generally, Rodin, supra note 18, at 3 (introducing the subject of digital 
signatures to the Business Law Section of the Washington State Bar Association). 
58. See Role of Certification Authorities, supra note 35, at 6. 
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ill. CONCLUSION 
There are many technological and legal barriers that will slow the 
growth of electronic commerce. The task confronting legislators and 
policymakers is to draft legislation to overcome these barriers using the 
same principles that have guided the development of other commercial 
laws. As Grant Gilmore observed, legislation should be "designed to 
clarify the law about business transactions rather than to change the 
habits of the business community . . . ."59 The Washington Electronic 
Authentication Act clarifies the law regarding the use of digital 
signatures. It will not legislate market winners because it gives parties 
the :freedom of contract. However, the default rules established by the 
Washington Act should reflect existing business expectations. The 
Washington Act and other digital signature legislation will not satisfy 
this principle until limitations on consumer liability are enacted. 
59. Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codi.fling Commercial Law, 51 Y ALB L.J. 
1341 (1948). 
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